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1.  Introduction
In  the  measurenent  of  inequality  and  poverty,  the
significance  of  intra-household  inequality  clearly  depends  on  the
objective  of  the  exercise.  In  the  growing  literature  on  this  subject,
the  reason  for  investigating  intra-household  inequality  is  that  the
ultimate  object  of  concern  for  economic  policy  is  the  well-being  of
individuals.  Yet  most  policy,  and  most  policy  analysis,  has  until
recently  equated  the  well-being  of  individuals  with  the  average
(adult-equivalent)  well-being  of  the  household  to  which  they  belong.
The  assumption  is  thus  that  within  a  household  resources  are  divided
according  to  need.  If  this  were  true,  then  policy  could  concentrate
on  increasing  the  resources  of  poor  households  without  getting
enmeshed  in  an  intra-household  policy  that  may be  difficult  to  design
and  even  more  difficult  to  execute.  However,  a  growing  body  of
empirical  literature  has  benun  to  question  whether  resources  within  a
household  are  indeed  distributed  according  to  need  (see  Sen,  1984;
Harris,  1986;  Behrman,  1987).  The  natural  corollary  is  thus  that
conventional  results  on  the  extent  and  pattern  of  inequality  and
poverty  as  revealed  by  household  level  resouroes  have  to  be re-
examined.
There  is,  however,  little  in  the  way  of  quantification  of
how much of  a  difference  the  existence  of  intra-household  inequality
wculd  make  to  conventional  measures  of  inequality  and  poverty.  Is  the
understatement  (if  any),  likely  to  be  large?  Even  if  the
understatement  of  the  levels  of  inequality  and  poverty  is  large,  are
the  patterns  of  inequality  and  poverty  grossly  different  when  one
takes  account  of  intra-household  inequality?  An answer  to  the  latter2
question  is  inportant  since  policy  design  (e.g.  directing  resouroes  to
particular  regions,  crcp  groups  etc.)  often  relies  on  the  pattern  of
poverty  and  inequality  (see,  for  example,  the  use  by  Anand  (1983)  of
inequality  and  poverty  deccmposition  to  analyse  the  efficacy  of
various  policies  in  Malaysia).
The  object  of this  paper  is  to  present  a  framework  in  which
these  questions  can  be  addressed,  and  then  to  apply  this  framework,  to
a  data  set  from  the  Philippines  on intra-household  inequality  in
nutritional  status.  Our  empirical  conclusions  are  likely  to  be  of
interest  to  those  who are  considering  undertaking  the  costly  task  of
an  intra-household  focused  survey  in  developing  countries.  These
oonclusions  can  be  stated  very  crudely  but  sinply  as  follows:
(i)  The neglect  of  intra-household  inequality  is  likely  to  lead
to  a  considerable  understatement  of  the  levels  of  inequality
and  poverty.
(ii)  However,  while  the  patterns  of  inequality  revealed  by
household  level  data  are  somewhat  different  to  those
revealed  by  individual  level  data,  these  differences  can  be
argued  to  be  not  dramatic.
The plan  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  The  next  section  develops  an
analytical  framework  for  assessing  the  inpact  of  intra-household
inequality  on  the  levels  of  inequality  and  poverty.  Section  3  applies
this  framework  after  introducing  our  data  set.  Section  4  concludes
the  paper.3
2.  A  Theoretical  Analysis
We suppose  that  the  object  of  interest  is  the  well-being  of
individuals,  which  is  measured  by  some agreed  standard  (consumption,
nutrition  etc.)  and  denoted  y.  It  is  assumed  that  all  relevant
corrections  and  adjustments  have  been  made and  incorporated  into  y
(e.g.  price  differences,  needs  differences  etc.) so that  it  really
does  represent  the  variable  on  which  social  welfare  is  define;.  Now
let  x  be  the  average  of  y  within  a  household.  Thus  the
distribution  of  individuals  by  x  would  ignore  intra-household
inequality  and  it  is  the  difference  between  this  distribution  and  the
distribution  of  y  that  lies  at  the  heart  of  the  analysis  in  this
paper.
Denote  the  conditional  density  of  y  given  x  as  a(y|  x).
This  captures  inequality  within  a  household  whose  average  standard  of
living  is  x.  If  p(x)  is  the  marginal  density  of  x  in  the
population,  then  the  density  of  y  in  the  population,  f (y),  is
clearly
(1)  f(y)  =  la(yi  x)  p(x)  dx
where  the  integration  is  over  the  permissible  range  of  x  (perhaps
non-negative).
Notioe  that  by  definition
(2)  E(yJ  x)  =  Iya(yj  x)  dy  =  x4
where  E  represents  the  expectation  operator.
Hbnce,
(3)  E(y)  =  Iyf(y)  dy  =  llya(y  x)  p(x)  dydx
= IE(yI  x)  p(x)  dx  = E(x)
Thus  the  mean of  y  is  the  same  as  the  mean  of x.  In  fact,  it  can
be  shon  that  the  distribution  of  y  is  a  mean preserving  spread  of
the  distribution  of  x.  To see  this,  consider  a  convex  function
h(.).  Note  that
(4)  Efh(y))  =  Ih(y)  f(y)  dy
=  I[Jh(y)  a(yl  x)  dyj  p(x)  dx
>  Ih(x)  p(x)  dx  by  Jensen's  inequality
= E{h(x)}
What (4)  tells  us  is  that  the  expectation  of  all  convex  functions  is
greater  under  the  distribution  of  y  than  under  the  distribution  of
x.  It  therefore  follows  (see  Rothschild  and  Stiglitz,  1970)  that
f(y) is  a  mean  preserving  spread  of p(x),  which  is  a  fairly
obvious  result.
Since f(y) is  a  mean  preserving  spread  of  p(x)  ,  it
follows  from  Atkinson  (1970)  that  the  Lorenz  curve  of  y  will  be
unambiguously  below  the  Lorenz  curve  of  x  on  a  Lorenz  diagram.  This
is  the  sense  in  which  inequality  will  always  be  understated  by  using
only  the  household  level  information.  The  "Lorenz  class"  of  measures
(see  Anand,  1983)  will  always  be lower  for x  than  for y  - for5
exanple,  the  Gini  coefficient  or  the  Theil  index  will  always  be
understated.
To illustrate  the  nature  of  the  discrepancy,  consider  as  a
measure  of inequality  the  coefficient  of  variation.  Since  the  means
of  y  and x  are  the  same,  in  this  case  we  might  as  well  use  the
variance. Triting  V(y) as  the  variance  of y ,  V(x)  as  the  variance
of x  and V(yl  x) as  the  variance  of y  conditional  on  x  (i.e.
the  variance  of  well-being  within  a  household  whose  average  well-being
is x),  we know  fran  the  analysis  of  variance  that
(5)  V(y)  =  N(y  x)  p(x)  dx  + V(x)
Thus  the  degree  of  discrepancy  depends  on  what V(y  |  x)  looks  like  for
different  values  of x . In  effect,  the  right  hand  side  of (5)
deconposes  the  inequality  of y  into  an  intra-household  coxponent  and
an  inter-household  conponent.  The  size  of  the  intra-household
component  - the  discrepancy  between  V(y)  and  V(x)  - is  an  empirical
matter  and  in  the  following  section  we provide  quantification  of  the
discrepancy  for  a  range  of  inequality  measures,  based  on  a  particular
data  set.
So  nuch  for  the  measured  level  of  inequality.  What  about
the  pattern  of inequality?  Suppose  that  our  households  could  be  split
into  two  mutually  exclusive  and  exhaustive  groups  U  and  R  ("urban"
and  "rural").  A typical  investigation  of  the  pattern  of  inequality
involves  two  questions:  (i)  Which group  has  higher  inequality?  (ii)
What  a  fraction  of  inequality  is  accounted  for  by  inequality  within
and  inequality  between  these  two groups?  These  questions  are  asked6
very  cx  mmonly  in  inequality  analysis  (e.g.  Theil,  1967;  Anand,  1983;
Tsakloglou,  1988)  and  they  are  inportant  for  policy  design.  Wculd  the
answers  differ  greatly  if  we  ignored  intra-household  inequality?
Taking  the  second  queastion first,  using  subscripts  U  and
R  in  an  obvious  way we  car  write:
(6)  V(y)  =  )AVu(Y)  + ARVR(Y)
+ lAIVU(Y)  - VR(y)1
where  i  and  i  are  population  proportions  in  the  two groups
(AU  + AR  = 1) and  p  represents  mean.  The between  group  compcnamt
of  overall  inequality  in  (6)  is  that  involving  the  .1roup  means.  The
between  group  contribution  is  defined  as
(7)  i(y) =  WYAi[.VU(Y)  - i.(y)J 2
The within  group  contribution  is  simply  1 - C  (y).
If  we  did  not  have  individual  level  data  but  relied  on
household  means,  then
(8)  V(x)  = AuVu(x)  +  ARVR(x)
+  AuAR  [%(x)  - PR(x)2
(9)  %(x)  R [j.U(x)  - VR(x)1 2
CB  (x)  e  V(x)7
But  with  a  suitable  adaptation  of  (3)  it  follows  that
a  (y)  = ju(x)  and  R (y)  =  R  (x).  Thus  the  absolute  value  of  the
between  group  conponent  is  the  same  whether  y  or  x  is  used.  Since
fran  (5)  we  know  that V(y)  >  V(x),  we  have  the  result  that
(10)  C (y)  < %(x)
Henoe  the  between  group  contribution  to  inequality  is  overstated  and
the  within  group  contribution  is  oorrespondingly  understated  when
intra-household  inequality  is  ignored.  While  (for  ease  of  exposition)
we have  derived  the  result  for  V(.),  it  holds  true  for  any  measure  of
inequality  where  the  between  group  coomponent depends  only  on  group
means  (for  this  approach  to  defining  "deccmposability",  see  Shorrocks,
1980).  For  exanple,  it  holds  true  for  the  well  known Theil  index  of
inequality,  which  forms  the  basis  of  many  empirical  studies.  The
extent  of  over  statemet  or  understatement  is  an  empirical  matter,  and
we shall  investigate  this  in  the  next  section  in  the  oontext  of  our
data  set.
What  of che  ranking  of  groups  by  inequality?  For  this,  note
that
(11)  VU(y)  =  NIU(yI  x)  pU(x)  dx  +  VU(X)
(!2)  VR(Y) = IVR(y  I x)  pR(x)  dx + VR(x)8
Fran  these:
(13)  Vu(x)  VR(x)  =  [Vu(y)  - VR(Y)J  - Vu(yIx)  pU(x)  dx
iVR(y I x)  pR(X)  dx]
Thus  we  get:
(14)  ([VU(Y)  - VR(y)J  I  0  => [Vu(x)  - VR(x)I  > 0)
{(Vu(y)  VR(y)I  >  1Ivu(y  I X)  pU  (x)  dx
- NR(y  I x  pR(x)  dx])
Similar  results  can  be  derived  for  other  indices  such  as  the
Theil  index.  The  general  point  is  that,  if  intra-household  inequality
in  the  two  groups  are  sufficiently  similar,  the  rankings  will  be
preserved.  However,  if  intra-household  inequality  is  very  much
greater  in  the  group  with  higher  overall  inequality,  then  suppression
of  this  intra-household  variation  could  lead  to  a  ranking  reversal.
Whether  this  actually  happens  or  not  is  e  empirical  matter,  and  we
will  investigate  it  further  in  the  next  section.
We turn  now to  an  analysis  of  poverty.  The  standard
approach  in  the  literature  (see  Sen,  1976)  is  to  choose  a  poverty  line
and  then  define  a  poverty  index  based  on  the  gap  between  the  value  of
the  variable  measuring  the  standard  of  well  being,  and  i'cs  critical
value  as  given  by  the  poverty  line.9
Define  a  gap  function"  as  hMy, z),  where  z  is  the
poverty  line.  Then  a  general  definition  of  a  class  of  poverty  indices
(see  Atkinson,  1987)  is
(15)  P(y)  =  Jh(y,  z)  f(y)  dy
If  we  only  had  information  on  household  averages  then  we would  be
forced  to  use
(16)  P(x)  =  Ih(x,  z)  p(x)  dx
But
(17)  P(y)  =  Ih(y,  z)  f(y)  dy
=  I[Ih(y,  z)  a(yI  x)  dy]  p(x)  dx
>  I[h(x,  z)]  p(x)  dx  if h  is  convex  in y
=  P(x)
Thus  if h(.,  z) is  convex  in  its  first  argument,  there  is  definitely
an  understatement  of  true  poverty  by  using  x  .
To  investigate  this  further,  consider  the  class  of  poverty
indices  recently  introduced  by  Foster,  Greer  and  Thorbecke  (FG)  in
1984.  In  terns  of  (15),  their  index  assumes
O  )  0;  y  <  z z
(18)  h(y,  z)  =
0  y>z10
Here,  a  is  an  index  of  poverty  aversion.  When  a = 0  ,  P  beocuuss
siiply  the  standard  head count  ratio  or  incidence  of  poverty  measure.
When  a = 1  ,  P  emphasises  the  average  depth  of  poverty  while  with
a  > 1  ,  P  is  sensitive  to  intra-poor  transfers.
Notice  that  with a  >  I  ,  h(y,  z)  is  convex in  y  . Thus
(17)  holds  and  we  can  be  sure  that  the  FG index  on x will
understate  true  poverty.  However, tor a < 1  h(y  ,  z)  is  neither
convex nor  concave  over  its  whole range  so  that  Jensen's  inequality
can no longer  be  used.  To  investigate  this  further,  consider  a  =  0
Then
(19)  PO(y)  =  IPO(y  Ix)  p(X)  dx
<  PO(Y I P(X))
according  as
P  (yI  x)  is  {conve )  in x-
Thus if  the  incidence  of  intra-household  poverty  is  corawve
in  x  and  the  incidence  of  intra-household  poverty  at  neon  household
consumption exceeds  the  incidence  of  poverty  defined  on  x  ,  then  the
latter  will  underestimate  the  true  incidence  of  poverty.  But  if  the
incidenoe  of  intra-household  poverty  is  convex in  x  and  the
incidence  of  intra-household  poverty  at  mean  household  consumption  is
less  than  the  incidence  of  poverty  defined  on  x  ,  then  the  latter
will  overestimate  the  true  incidence  of  poverty.11
Other  sufficient  conditions  can  also  be  derived.  It  can  be
shown  that  if
(20)  y  = h(x,  c)
where  c  is  randon  and  h  is  increasing  and  quasi-concave  in  its
arguments,  then  PO(X)  will  understate  true  poverty  if  the  poverty
line  is  less  than  mean  y  ,  which  is  equal  to  mean  x  . (Ravallion
(1988)  derives  this  result  in  a  different  context.)  A ncoessary  and
sufficient  condition  can  be  derived  if  we  further  specialise  to
Y  =X  +  E
E(E)  =0O
(21)  Var  (c)  =2
Cov(X,  E)  =0
Then
E(y)  =  E(x)
Var(y)  =  Var(x)  +  a2
If  we further  restrict  ourselves  to  y  and  x  being  synmetric
distributions  (e.g.  the  normal  distribution)  then  it  follows  easily
that
(22)  PO(Y)  PO(x) according  as  z  e3 p(y)12
Thus the  x  indicator  overstates  poverty  if  the  poverty  line  exceeds
the  mean of  y  - we  shall  see  an espirical  verification  of  this
result  in  our  data  set.
Let  us  now turn  to  the  difference  that  can  be made to  an
analysis  of  poverty  patterns  across  mutually  exclusive  and  exhaustive
groups.  As before,  let  these  be  indexed  U  and  R ,  with  population
proportions  Ai  and  i  . Wb  know that
(23)  P(Y)  =  VU(Y)  +  ARPR(y)
and  the  contribution  of  region  U  to  poverty,  CU(y)  is  written
(24)  C  (y)  =  (Y)
Similarly:
(25)  P(x)  uPU(x)  +  kR(P)
(26)  %(x)  =vU()
CU  ~~~  PRU()(x))  P(y Thus
(27)  %u(y)  - U(x)  =  Ati9u(x  PR(x) I  PU(y)_  R)
P  (y) (X-)  P~(x) -PR(13
We  already  know that  if  h  is  convex in  y  then
PU(Y)  >  Pu(x)  and PR(y)  >  PR(x)  ,  i.e.  true  poverty  is  understated
in  both  groups  when  measured  using  x . However,  for  the  measured
contributions  to  poverty  to  be  very  different,  the  degree  of
understatement  has  to  be greatly  different  in  the  two regicns.  In
other  words,  intra-household  inequality,  and  its  pattern,  has  to  be
very  different  when camparing  across  the  two groups.  The same is  of
course  also  true  when  considering  poverty  ranking  reversals.  If
PJ(y)  > PR(y)  and  the  pattern  of  intra-household  inequality  is  the
same  or  very  similar  in  the  two  groups  then  Pu(x)  >  PR(x)  will  also
hold.  Cnly  if  the  patterns  are  significantly  different  will  ranking
reversals  take  place.  once  again,  whether  this  happens  or  not  is  an
empirical  matter  and we  turn  now to  an  investigation  of  our
theoretical  framework as  applied  to  a  particular  dataset.14
3.  An Empirical  Analysis
3.1  The  Data  Set  and  the  Variables
Having  developed  a  theoretical  framework  and  scme  results  on
what  difference  the  neglect  of  intra-household  inequality  can  make  to
the  measurement  and  deccnposition  of  inequality  and  poverty,  it  is  now
time  to  investigate  a  specific  dataset.
The  data  used  in  this  study  are  described  and  evaluated
fully  in  Bcuis  and  Haddad  (1989a).  They  cone  from  a  survey  of  the
predominantly  rural  southern  Philippine  providence  of  Bukidnon.  The
survey  was  conducted  in  four  rounds  over  a  sixteen  month  period  in
1984-85,  covering  448  households  ccmprising  2880  individuals.  The
only  good  for  whicn  we can  identify  individual  consumption  is  food.
Therefore  we  focus  on  food,  converting  dietary  intake  into  calories
and  standardising  by  calorie  requirements,  to  give  calorie  adequacy.
Calorie  adequacy  will  be  our  measure  of  individual  well
being.  There  is  now  a  large  and  controversial  literature  on  the
appropriateness  of  this  variable  for  welfare  and  policy  analysis.
However,  recall  that  our  object  is  to  investigate  the  consequences  of
neglecting  intra-household  inequality  for  the  measurement  of
inequality  and  poverty.  Food  consumption  is  one  of  the  few  variables
on  which  intra-household  data  can  be  collected  and  as  such,  is  suited
to  our  analysis.
Calorie  intakes  in  our  data  set  represent  24  hour  recalls  by
the  mDther,  of  food  eaten  by  individual  family  menmers.  This15
information  may be  subject  to  a  number  of  errors,  both  in  overall
quantity  recall  and  allocative  recall.  Burke  and  Pao  (1976)  review
the  methodological  evaluation  literature  for  large  scale  surveys  of
individual  diets.  Using  the  evaluation  criteria  of  reliability  (small
variable  errors),  validity  (small  biases),  respondent  burden,  and  data
oosts,  they  oompare  24  hour  recalls  with  dietary  history,  food
weighing  and  inventoty-record  methodologies.  They  conclude  that  "no
one  methd  was  consistently  advantageous  over  all  others".  24  hour
recalls  did  well  in  ternm  of  light  respondent  burden  and  ease  of
collection,  but  were  biased  to  an  extent  primarily  dependent  on  the
skill  and  probing  abilities  of  the  enumeration  team.  The  studies
reviewed  covered  mainly  developed  countries,  and  we should  note  that
different  problems  may arise  from  their  application  in  less  developed
countries:  toddler  "snacking"  away  fran  home,  for  instance  (although
less  varied  LDC  diets  may strengthen  the  24  hour  recall  method).
The  position  with  respect  to  the  24  hour  recall  method  is
sufmed  up  by  Chavez  and  Huenemann (in  Sahn  et  al,  1984):  "Because  of
the  short  time  period,  this  method  [24  hour  recallJ  is  more  econcmical
than  the  detailed  method  and  the  modified  dietary  history  method.  Cne
day  may or  may not  represent  a  'typical'  intake  for  the  individual
household.  Twenty-four  hour  intakes  of  a  large  sample  of  households
may,  hoyever,  represent  a  typical  daily  intake  for  the  community  as  a
,whole".  We have  minimised  problems  of  representativeness  by  using
only  four-round  averages  of  calorie  intake  for  each  individual  in  an
attenpt  to  make  the  dietary  snapshots  more  typical.  This  technique
has  been  used  for  a  number  of  years  by  the  USDA  in  its  National  Food
Consumption  Surveys  (U5CA,  1988).16
Concerning  measurement errors,  two sources  of  evidence
attest  to  the  accuracy  of  our  enumerators'  data  collection  efforts.
Firstly,  calorie  consumption  figures  calculated  from  two different
methodologies  (24 hour  recall  and  food  expenditure  data)  exhibited  a
high  degree  of  correspondence  at  the  means of  the  data  (Bouis and
Haddad,  1989b).  Furthermore,  the  24 hour  recall  intakes  corresponded
closely  to  a  small,  overlapping,  subsample of  food weighings  conducted
simultaneously  (Corpus et  al,  1987).
The dencminator  of  the  calorie  adequacy ratio  is  calorie
requirement.  We  use  orthodox  reccuerxuded daily  allowance  (RDA)
calorie  figures  for  a  healthy  Philippine  population  with  requirements
diasaggregated  into  thirty-two  age-gender-pregnancy  status  categories
(details  in  Bouis  and Haddad,  1988).  We recognise  the  limitations  of
RDA's  in  the  context  in  which we plan  to  use  them.  Firstly,  in  a
normal distribution  of  healthy  individuals  in  a  given  age-gernder-
pregnancy-activity  level  group,  50%  will  have intakes  below  the  RDA.
This  reflects  the  construction  of  RDA's  as  an average  requirenent
(Davidson,  et  al,  1979).  Secondly,  the  requirements  take  no account
of  an  individual's  unrestricted  physical  activity  level.  Even the
crude  classification  into  limited,  moderate,  and extrene  physical
activity  is  difficult  to  achieve  in  the  absence  of  well  collected
time-activity  data.  Thirdly,  the  requirenents  take  no account  of
individual  adaptation  to  food  availability  in  the  form of  activity
patterns,  longitudinal  growth retardation  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,
basal  metabolic  rate  adjustment.
These problems  are  not  trivial,  but  until  individual
requirements  for  full  functional  capacity  are  available  the  best  we17
can  do  is  to  use  the  RDA's,  and  note  that  they  represent  "an  order  of
nagnitude"  (Achaya,  1983).
Our  object  is  to  assess  the  seriousness  of  neglecting  intra-
household  inequality.  In  our  data  set,  since  we  have  individual  level
data  we can  "pretend"  that  we do  not  have  this  information  by  taking
household  averages.  However,  in  the  emvirical  context  we now have  a
choice  of  whether  to  take  the  mean  of  individual  adeuqacy  ratios,  or
to  take  the  ratio  of  the  within-household  mean of  individual  calorie
intakes  and  individual  requirements.  There  are  thus  three  variables
of  interest:  individual  calorie  adequacy,  0  ,  mean  individual
calorie  adequacy  within  the  household,  01,  and  household  calorie
adequacy,  02  . Mbre  precisely,  let
C.  =  calorie  intake  of  individual  i
R.  =  calorie  requirenent  of  individual  i
Oi  =  i/Ri  = calorie  adequacy  of  individual  i
n  =  number  of  individuals  in  household  h
01i  =  n  z  oi  =  mean of  individual  calorie  adequacy
within  the  household,  which  is
assigned  to  each  household  member.
nh
=  1=1  =  household  calorie  adequacy,  which  is
2  nh
iR ili  assigried  to  each  household  me8lber.18
Referring  to  our  theoretical  discussion,  0  corresponds  to
y  and 01  to  x  . But  in  the  empirical  rontext  we typically  have
to  deal  not  with  01 but  with  02  since  information  is  collected  at
the  household  level  on  calorie  intake  and  calorie  requirement
separately  While 01 and  02  will  differ,  we  shall  see  that  the
difference,  and  its  empirical  effect,  is  not  very  great.
These  three  variables  are  calculated  for  all  2800
individuals  in  our  sanple.  We should  note  that  all  individuals  within
a  household  will  have  identical  values  for  01  . The  same  is  true
for  02  . Figure  1 shows  the  relative  frequency  plots  for  the  three
variables.  Nor  surprisingly,  the  range  for  0  is  the  largest  of  the
three.  Its  distribution  is  skewed  to  the  right  but  approaches
normality.  The  plot  for  01  is  less  of  a  normal  approximation  than
0  ,  while  the  plot  for  02 is  fairly  similar  to  that  of  01 .
The  mean  of  0  over  the  2880  individuals  in  the  sanple  is
0.877-5,  indicating  that  on  average  our  sample  is  significantly
undernourished.  The mean  of  01  is  by  definition  the  same  as  the
mean of  0  . However,  the  mean  of  02 is  0.88835,  an  excess  of 1.2%,
indicating  slight  negative  correlation  between  calorie  intake  and
calorie  requirement.  Or  real  object,  however,  is  to  examine  and
compare measures  of  inequality  and  poverty  defined  over  0  ,  01  and
02  . We start  with  inequality.19
3.2  Measurement  and  Decomposition  of Inequality
Figure  2  compares  the  Lorenz  curve  of  0  with  those  of
01 and  02  . We proved  in  Section  2  that  the  Lorenz  curve  of  01
would  be  uniambiguously  closer  to  the  line  of  perfect  equality  than  the
Lorenz  curve  of  and  this  is  shown  to  be  the  case  in  Figure  2a.  The
same  comparison  holds  for  02 and  0  ,  and  in  fact  the  Lorenz  curves
of  01 and 02 are  almost  identical.
Table  1  quantifies  inequality  differences  with  respect  to
five  commonly  used  measures  of  inequality:  the  coefficient  of
variation,  the  log-variance,  the  Gini  coefficient,  the  Theil  index  T,
Theil's  second  measure  L  and  the  Atkinson  equally  distributed
equivalent  measure  of inequality  with  inequality  aversion  parameter
equal  to  2. The  exact  definitions  of these  measures  are  to  be  found
in  Kanbur  (1984).  The  first  point  to  note  is  how  close  the  measures
based  on  01 and 02 are  to  each  other. With  this  in  mind,  we
concentrate  on  the  differences  between 0  and  01
As can  be  seen,  the  understatements  of  inequality  when
intra-household  inequality  is  suppressed  can  be  very  large,  ranging
from  around  60% for  the  log-variance,  the  Theil  T  ,  and  Theil  L  and
the  Atkinson  measure,  to  35% for  the  Gini  and  the  coefficient  of
variation.  It  may be  tempting  to  attribute  the  difference  to  "within"
household  inequality,  but  such  a  precise  attribution  depends  on
whether  or  not  the  measure  is  "decomposable"  in  the  sense  of  Shorrocks
(1980).  Only  the  two  Theil  measures  satisfy  the  relevant  conditions
of  strict  sub-group  decomposability.Figure  1.  Relative  Frequenc.  :stributions  for  0. 0  *  and  02
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We turn  now  to  the  issue  of the  pattern  of inequality  as
revealed  by the  data. it  is  traditional  in  inequality  and  poverty
analysis  to  decompose  inequality  along  key  socio-economic  dimensions.
Thus  Anand  (1983)  provides  a  profile  of inequality  in  Malayasia  along
racial  lines  while  Tsakloglou  (1988)  does  the  same  exercise  for  Greece
along  regional  lines.  The  exact  nature  of  the  profile  depends  on  the
policy  question  at  hand. In  the  Philippine  region  of  Bukidnon,  one  of
the  central  issues  has  been  the  impact  of  a  move  from  corn  to  sugar
production  on inequality  and  poverty.  Bouis  and  Haddad  (1988)  provide
a  detailed  analysis  of the  nutrition  and  income  effects  of  the
incroduction  of  sugar  can  cultivation  in  the  study  area. Our  object
here  is  more  limited  - it  is  to  investigate  the  sensitivity  of  the
pattern  of inequality,  across  the  sub-groups  identified  by  Bouis  and
Haddad  (1989a)  as  being  important,  to  the  use  of individual  or
household  level  data.
The  first  panel  of  Table  2  shows  a  decomposition  of  the
Theil  T index  across  three  mutually  exclusive  and  exhaustive  types  of
households  - corn  producers,  sugar  producers  and  others.  As  can  be
seen,  the  2880  individuals  in  the  sample  are  divided  as  follows:  1565
in  corn  producing  households,  1082  in  sugar  producing  households  and
233  in  other  households.  It  is  immediately  seen  that  if  we  compare
inequality  as  measured  by  the  Theil  T index  defined  on  0  (individual
level  data),  inequality  among  individuals  in  sugar  households  is
greater  than  that  among  individuals  in  corn  households,  while
inequality  among  households  that  grow  neither  crop  is  greatest.  A
shift  in  favour  of  sugar,  perticularly  if  this  creates  landless
labourers  in  the  process  is  therefore  worrying  from  the  point  of  view
of inequality.  Would  this  conclusion  have  been  greatly  affected  if  weTable  1. Inequality  Measures  for  0 ,  01 ,  ard 02
Variable  n  mean  oCefficient  Log Variance  Gini  TheilT  TheilL  Atkinson
of  Variation  Coefficient  (base  e)  (base  e)  Measure
(c.=2)
0  2880  .87765  .31419  .10897  .1754  .04873  .05078  .10229
01  2880  .87765  .20386  .04257  .1148  .02059  .02083  .04127
(% of  0)  (65)  (39)  (65)  (42)  (41)  (40)
°2  2880  .88835  .19998  .04118  .1090  .01986  .02012  .03996
(% of  0)  (64)  (38)  (62)  (41)  (40)  (40)24
had  had  information  on  calorie  adequacy  only  at  the  household  level?
The  answer  is  no.  The  inequality  ranking  of  the  three  groups  remains
unchanged  whether  0  ,  01  or  02  is  used  as  the  basis  of  inequality
calculations.  As was  pointed  out  in  Section  2,  for  ranking  reversals
to  take  place  it  has  to  be  the  case  that  patterns  of  intra-household
inequality  are  vastly  different  from  group  to  group  - this  is  clearly
not  the  case  for  our  data  set.
An alternative  dimension  to  be  considered  is  tenure  status.
As Bouis  and  Haddad  (1989a)  document,  households  which  managed  to
overcome  the  barriers  to  entry  of  sugar  cane  cultivation  (i.e.  those
who secured  a  mill  contract,  with  sufficient  credit,  and  were  close
enough  to  the  mill  so  as  not  to  make  transport  costs  prohibitive)
realised  substantial  increases  in  agricultural  profits.  However,  for
every  household  able  to  capitalise  on  the  mill  start-up  there  was  a
household  that  experienced  a  degradation  in  tenure  status.  Because  of
the  low  profits  earned  on  corn  cultivation,  landowners  unable  to
overcome  the  barriers  to  sugar  cane  cultivation  were  tempted  into
short-run  capital  gains  through  selling  their  land  and  then  selling
their  labour.  Some pre-sugar  share-tenants  were  sinply  evicted  by
landowners  eager  to  reap  the  sugar  cane  profits,  and  were  replaced  by
migrant  cane  labourers.
The  second  panel  in  Table  2 provides  intra-group
inequalities  based  on  0  ,  0  1  and 02  for  five  tenure  status  groups.
once  again,  we see  that  the  rankings  remain  unaffected.  The  lowest
inequality  is  among  households  that  have  a  mixed  owner/renter  status,
with  pure  tenancy  status  coming  next,  followed  by  labourers,  owners,25
Table  2.  Theil  T  Inequality  Measures  For  Selected  Subgroups  Using
0  01  ,  and 02
GRCUP  N  p(0)  p(01)  p(02)  T(O)  T(01)  T(02)
Corn  1565  .88379  .88379  .89338  .04736  .02019  .01953
Sugar  1082  .87938  .87938  .89144  .04999  .02065  .01980
No  Crop  233  .82843  .82843  .84025  .05048  .02141  .02083
Within  .04859  .02046  .01973
Between  .00014  .00014  .00013
%  Between  0.29  0.68  0.66
owner  695  .89826  .89826  .90311  .05076  .02113  .01993
Mix  516  .89603  .89603  .90497  .04401  .01815  .01785
Tenant  758  .88679  .88679  .90000  .04728  .02017  .01964
Labourer  580  .84614  .84614  .86168  .04838  .02018  .01987
Other  Ten  331  .84004  .84004  .85154  .05292  .02203  .02107
Within  .04837  .02024  .01959
Between  .00036  .00036  .00028
% Between  0.74  1.8  1.4
Corn  Own  341  .89133  .89133  .89588  .05232  .02227  .02126
Corn  Mix  310  .87277  .87277  .88165  .04223  .01715  .01693
Corm  Share  549  .89237  .89237  .90350  .04491  .02022  .01996
Corn  Lab  267  .87524  .87524  .88847  .04788  .01968  .01859
Sug  Own  354  .90494  .90494  .91006  .04922  .01999  .01861
Sug  Mix  206  .93104  .93104  .94007  .04529  .01835  .01795
Sug  Rent  209  .87215  .87215  .89079  .05347  .01983  .01871
Sug  Lab  313  .82131  .82131  .83882  .04787  .01967  .02023
Other  Ooc  233  .82843  .62843  .84025  .05048  .02141  .02083
Corm  Othrmt  98  .86765  .86765  .87838  .05771  .02269  .02093
Within  .04814  .02001  .01938
Between  .00059  .00059  .00049
%  Between  1.21  2.9  2.5
Notes:  1.  "Other  Ten"  - Other  Tenure  Status.
2.  Abbreviations  in  third  panel  correspond  to  full  labels  given
in  Table  3.26
and  other  teure  status  l  duseholds.  This  inquality  rancing  w
maintained  wtether  irixvidual  level  or  thouehold  level  informtion  ws
uwed.  Clearly,  then,  the  ectra  infornntion  of  intra4muehold
irequaity  does  not  affect  the  conclusion  an  patterm  of  irmquaity  at
this  level  of  disaggregation,  ed  therefore  any  calusions  that  mrght
follow  an  the  oox-euke  for  overall  irality  of  the  introduction
of  sugar  cultivation.
11h final  level  of  dis  tion  we tried  s  that  given  in
the  third  panel  of  Table  2,  where ten  niully  ecluive ad
exdaustive  groups  of  houeholds  are  identified  aooording  to  crop  and
tenure  status.  We  would especi,  of  course,  that  as  the  digrergation
bexmnnes  finer  and  firer  and  groups  b1xxzne  more hmrigenous  ,  eventually
rarng  chiaqs  would  begin  to  aear.  Table  3 show the  rarks  in
question.  Using 9  the  oorn/imed  tenarncy group  is  the  least  ureqLul
while  the  corrVother  rental  arrangeint  group  is  most  urqual. Ahe
saw  is  true  if  we use  0,  . With  02 the  oor/mixed  grOxp  is  still
least  uequal  but  the  corr/cwner  grouxp is  now rlt  unequal.  Acoording
to  the  1  and 0  ranirgs  the  corr/owner  groups  is  8th  nvmt unqual
and  9th  most  ursxqul  r emctively.  in  order  to  get  a  quLwtitative
feel  for  the  extent  of  rank  reversal  we calculated  SpeaEnls  rink
correlation  coefficients.  The rank  correlation  coefficient  bebieen
01 and 02  is  0.85,  indicating  very  close  association  between the
tbo  ranks.  That  be  n 0  and 01 is  0.72.  IThe  lowst  value  for
the  coefficient  is  betwe  0n  *and *2  is  0.66.  urn  we  cm  candCude
that  the  extent  of  rank  dhwiges  when  we msiadh fro  indivi&.l  bo
household  level  data  is  significant  but  not  dreamtic.27
Table  3:  Theil  T  Inequality  Rankings  For  Crop-Tenancyv Groups  By
Household  and  Individual-Level  Data
Group  Ranking  By
Least  0  01  02
Unequal
Corn  mixed  tenancy  1  1  1
Corn  share  tenant  2  7  6
Sugar  mixed  tenancy  3  2  2
Sugar  labourer  4  3  7
Corn  labourer  5  4  3
Sugar  owner  6  6  4
other  occupation  7  8  8
Corn  owner  8  9  10
Sugar  renter  9  5  5
Corn  other  rental
arrangement  10  10  9
nbst
Unequal28
Finally,  fron  Table  2 we  note  the  enpirical  confirmation  of
our  theoretical  result  that  the  between  group  cxnponent  of  inequality
will  be  unchanged  whether  0  or  01  is  used,  sinoe  this  depends
only  on  group  means  and  the  conditional  mean of  0  is  the  same as  the
conditional  mean of  01 for  any  conditioning  variable.  Since  the
within  group  cxponent  of  inequality  is  irevitably  greater  with  0
than  with  01  ,  it  follows  that  the  contribution  of  this  component
to  total  inequality  when 0  is  used  is  greater  than  when  01  is
used. Correspondingly,  with 0  the  contribution  of  the  between  group
component  is  lower  than  with  01  . Tn  our  dataset,  these  conslusions
are  unchanged  when 01 is  replaced  by  02 .
3.3  Measurement  and  Deccnvosition  of  Poverty
In  Section  2  we derived  a  number  of  theoretical  results  on
the  likely  inpact  of  intra-household  inequality  on  measured  poverty.
The  object  of  this  subsection  is  to  consider  an  eapirical  analysis
based  on  our  data  set.  Any neasurenent  of  poverty  requires  us  to
specify  a  poverty  line.  In  the  context  of  the  variable  of  interest  in
this  study  - the  calorie  adequacy  ratio  - an  appropriate  poverty  line
is  siuply  1.  All  those  with  calorie  adequacy  ratio  less  than  1 can
reasonably  be  argued  to  be  undernourished  or  "poor"  in  the  terminology
of  income  puverty.  We will  concentrate  attention  on  the  class  of
poverty  indices  put  forward  by  Ebster,  Greer  and  Thorbecke  (1984).
Adapting  the  notation  of  (15)  and  (18),  these  can  be  written  as
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where  0  is  calorie  adequacy,  f(.)  its  frequency  density,  and  a  is
the  poverty  aversion  parameter.  We focus  on  Q =  0,  1,  2  in  our
discussion.
Table  4 presents  values  of  PO ,  P1 . and  P2 based  on
0 ,  01  ,  and 02 . we have  already  provAx  that  for  a  > 1  Pa  for
0  will  exceed PQ  for  01 . This  is  seen  in  the  table.  Ignoring
intra-household  inequality  leads  to  an  understatement  of  P1 of  18.4*
if 01  is  used  and  23.0%  if  02  is  used. Similarly,  if P2 is  the
accepted  index  of  poverty  then  there  is  an  understatenent  of  39.4%
with  01  and  44.4%  with 02 . Clearly,  then,  there  is  a  dramatic
understatement  of  poverty  if  intra-household  inequality  is  ignored,
for  a>  1  .
However,  notice  with  with  a  = 0  the  situation  is
the  other  way round,  there  is  now  a  significant  overstatement  of
poverty  if  intra-houshehold  inequality  is  ignored.  Using  0  there
are  70.2% of  individuals  below  the  calorie  adequacy  ratio  of  1,  while
using  01  76.9% of  individuals  fall  below  this  critical  value  - an
overstatement  of 9.4%.  The  explanation  for  this  reversal  is  to  be
found  in  equation  (22)  of  Section  2.  Under  certain  conditions  we
showed  that  the  incidenoe  of  poverty  (or  under-nutrition)  will  be
overstated  by  household  level  data  if  the  poverty  line  exceeds  the
population  mean.  This  is  exactly  what  happens  in  our  data  - the
mean  of  0  (and 01)  is  0.88  while  the  chosen  poverty  line  is  1.00.30
Table  4.  Poverty  Measures  For  0 ,  01 and 02
Variable  n  Mean  PO  Pi  P2
0  2880  .87765  .70243  .18640  .06759
01  2880  .87765  .76875  .15201  .04093
02  2880  .88835  .75764  .14355  .03756
Note:  P  ,  P1 ,and  P2 are  the  P.  class  of  indices  where
=  0,  1,  231
Table  5.  P  Poverty  Measures  For  Selected  Subgroups  Using  0,
01 ,  and  02
RaJP  N  P 0(0) P(o)  P2(0)  Poo 0 (0 1)  P22(01)  Po(02)  P1(02)  P2(02)
ALL  2880  .70243  .18640  .06759  .76875  .15201  .04093  .75764  .14355  .03756
Corn  1565  .69521  .18144  .06483  .75463  .14661  .03925  .73738  .13897  .03632
Sugar  1082  .70055  .18592  .06811  .77634  .15042  .04029  .77172  .14125  .03647
No  Crop  233  .75966  .22203  .08369  .82833  .19571  .05516  .82833  .18494  .05097
cwner  695  .68345  .17584  .06342  .74964  .14021  .03716  .74964  .13459  .03495
Mix  516  .67636  .17171  .05930  .70543  .13731  .03354  .72093  .13092  .03137
Tienmt  758  .688(3  .17792  .06445  .76253  .14202  .03822  .74802  .13265  .03441
Labourer  580  .743:0  .20589  .07605  .83276  .17269  .04884  .78276  .16133  .04424
Other  Ten  331  .74320  .21676  .08159  .80967  .18633  .05270  .80967  .17582  .04822
Corn  Own  341  .68622  .18359  .06663  .73607  .14803  .03970  .73607  .14226  .03797
Corn  Mix  310  .71613  .18241  .06382  .70968  .15507  .03895  .70968  .14857  .03646
Corn  Share  549  .68852  .17219  .06080  .76138  .13601  .03740  .74499  .12825  .03452
Corn  Lab  267  .69288  .18820  .06766  .81273  .15036  .04007  .74532  .14009  .03578
Sug  Own  354  .68079  .16837  .06034  .76271  .13269  .03472  .76271  .12720  .03204
Sug  Mix  206  .61650  .15562  .05250  .69903  .11059  .02541  .73786  .10435  .02370
Sug  Rent  209  .68900  .19298  .07404  .76555  .15781  .04037  .75598  .14421  .03412
Sug  Lab  313  .78594  .22099  .08320  .84984  .19174  .05632  .81470  .17946  .05146
Other  Ooc  233  .75966  .22203  .08369  .82833  .19571  .05516  .82833  .18494  .05097
Corn  Orthnt  98 .70408  .20423  .07661  .76531  .16404  .04685  .76531  .15414  .04168
Male  1484  .72372  .19017  .06863  .77089  .15058  .04016  .76146  .14262  .03691
Female  1396  .67980  .18240  .06648  .76648  .15353  .04175  .75358  .14453  .03826
Adult*  1191  .48615  .10074  .03259  .75231  .14757  .03957  .74139  .13920  .03633
Non  Adult  1689  .85494  .24681  .09226  .78034  .15515  .04189  .76909  .14661  .03843
*  Non-Adults  are  defined  as  individuals  less  than  or  equal  to  nineteen  years  of  age
in  accordance  with  definitions  employed  by  the  National  Nutrition  Council  of  the
Philippines  for  calorie  requirements.  (NNC,  1976).32
Table  6.  P1 Poverty  Rankings  For  Crqp-Tenancy  Groups  by
Household  and  Individual-Level  Data
Group  Ranking  By
Least  Poverty  0  01  02
Sugar  mixed  tenancy  1  1  1
Sugar  owner  2  2  2
Corn  share  tenant  3  3  3
Corn  mixed  tenancy  4  6  7
Corn  owner  5  4  5
Corn  labourer  6  5  4
Sugar  renter  7  7  6
Corn  other  rental
arrangement  8  8  8
Sugar  labourer  9  9  9
Other  occupation  10  10  10
Most  poverty33
Let  us  turn  now  to  the  pattern  of  poverty  across  socio-
ecooncmic  groups.  Table  5 presents  group  values  of  P.  indices.
The first  three  panels  of  Table  5 use  the  same mutually  exclusive  and
exhaustive  groups  as  in  Table  2.  The policy  relevance  of  these
household  level  grouping  has  already  been discussed  in  Section  3.2.
The theoretical  significance  of  PQ  rankings  of  sectors
and groups  has  been discussed  by Kanbur  (1987)  in  the  context  of
targeting  and poverty  alleviation.  We  note  here  that  there  are  no
ranking  changes  in  the  first  or  the  second  panel.  As argued  earlier,
we would  expect  some rank  changes  to  occur  as  the  classification  gets
finer.  However, even with  10 groups  the  changes  are  very  small.
Table  6  summarises the  rankings  for  the  P1 measure.  As can  be  seen,
the  three  poorest  and  three  least  poor  groups  in  the  ranking  are
unchanged  as  between  0  ,  01 and 02 . The  rank  correlation
coefficient  between  0  and  01  is  (0.96)  and  that  between  0  and
01 is  (0.96)  and  that  between  0  and 02 is  (0.9).  Clearly,  then
the  neglect  of  intra-household  inequality  is  not  leading  to  dramatic
changes  in  poverty  ranking.
The  groupings  used  so  far,  and  those  discussed  in  the
theoretical  section,  are  those  defined  at  the  Ihusehold  level.  Ebr
som  policy  purposes,  hotever,  individual  level  groupings  are  required.
The last  two panels  in  Table  5 consider  two such groupings  which are
of  obvious  interest  - male/female  and adult/non-adult.  The adult/non-
adult  division  reveals  no  P.  ranking  differences  as  between  0  ,
01  and  02  . However, we find  that  iale-female  P1 and  P2 rankings
are  reversed  when oomparing  0  with  01  and  0  with  02  . This34
could  be  potentially  serious  if  targeting  policy  towards  males  and
females  (for  exanple  in  supplemental  feeding  programmes)  is  to  be
based  on  the  degree  of  observed  under-nutrition  in  these  groups.
However,  this  is  the  only  case,  in  all  of  the  deconpositions  in  Table
5,  where  rank  reversal  is  potentially  serious.
Finally,  we consider  group  contributions  to  poverty  based  on
0  ,  01  and  02  . Table  7  presents  this  analysis.  The  first  four
panels  in  Table  7 show  the  similar  contributions  each  group  makes  to
overall  poverty  whether  we use  0  ,  01  ,  or  02  . As we argued
earlier,  intra-household  inequality  would  have  to  be  very  different
when conparing  across  groups  for  the  contributions  to  poverty  to
differ  by  much.
Although  the  only  individual-level  grouping  that  experienoes
a  ranking  reversal  in  Table  5 is  the  male/fenale  classification,  the
difference  between  adult/non-adult  poverty  levels  widens  substantially
as  we move from  poverty  measures  based  on  01  and  02  ,  to  those
based  on  0  . This  is  emphasised  in  the  bottcm  panel  of  Table  7,
which  shows  the  non-adult  contribution  to  poverty  measures  based  on  0
be  in  the  70-80% range,  but  falling  to  60%  when  01  and  02 are
used.35
Table  7.  Percentage  Group Contributions  to  Pe Poverty
Measures  using 0 ,  01  ,  and  02
CQOlJP  N  Po(0)  P1(0)  P2(0)  Po(01)  P  (01)  P2(01)  Po(02)  1  2  2  2
ALL  2800  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Corn  1565 53.8  52.9  52.1  53.3  52.4  52.1  52.9  52.6  52.5
Sugar  1082 37.5  37.5  37.9  37.9  37.2  37.0  38.3  37.0  36.5
No  Crop  233  8.7  9.6  10.0  8.7  10.4  10.9  8.8  10.4  11.0
Owner  695 23.5  22.8  22.6  23.5  22.3  21.9  23.9  22.6  22.5
mix  516 17.3  16.5  15.7  16.4  16.2  14.7  17.0  16.3  15.0
Tenant  758 25.8  25.1  25.1  26.1  24.6  24.6  26.0  24.3  24.1
Labourer  580 21.3  22.2  22.7  21.8  22.9  24.0  20.8  22.6  23.7
Other  Ten  331 12.2  13.4  13.9  12.1  14.1  14.8  12.3  14.1  14.8
Com Own  341  11.6  11.7  11.7  11.3  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.7  12.0
Corn  Mix  310  11.0  10.5  10.2  9.9  11.0  10.2  10.1  11.1  10.4
Corn  Share  549  18.7  17.6  17.1  18.9  17.1  17.4  18.7  17.0  17.5
Corn  Lab  267  9.1  9.4  9.3  9.8  9.2  9.1  9.1  9.0  8.8
Sug Own  354 11.9  11.1  11.3  12.2  10.7  10.4  12.4  10.9  10.5
Sug Mix  206  6.3  6.0  5.6  6.5  5.2  4.4  7.0  5.2  4.5
Sug Rent  209  7.1  7.5  7.9  7.2  7.5  7.2  7.2  7.3  6.6
Sug Lab  313 12.2  12.9  13.4  12.0  13.7  15.0  11.7  13.6  14.9
Other  Oxc  233  8.7  9.6  10.0  8.7  10.4  10.9  8.8  10.4  11.0
Corn Othrnt  98  3.4  3.7  3.9  3.4  3.7  3.9  3.4  3.7  3.8
Male  1484  53.1  52.6  52.3  51.7  51.0  50.6  51.8  51.2  50.6
Female  1396  46.9  47.4  47.7  48.3  49.0  49.4  48.2  48.8  49.4
Adult*  1191 28.6  22.3  19.9  40.5  40.1  40.0  40.5  40.1  40.0
Non-Adult  1689 71.4  77.7  80.1  59.5  59.9  60.0  59.5  59.9  60.0
*Non-Adults are  defined  as  individuals  less  than  or  equal  to  nineteen  years  of  age  in
accordance  with  definitions  employed by  the  National  Nutrition  Council  of  the
Philippines  for  calorie  requirements  (NNC,  1976).36
4.  Conclusion
The  object  of  this  paper  has  been,  firstly,  to  develop  a
framework  in  which  the  consequences  of  ignoring  intra-household
inequality  for  the  measurement  and  decomposition  of  inequality  and
poverty  can  be  assessed  arnd,  secondly,  to  applv  this  framework  to  a
particular  dataset.  Our  theoretical  analysis  suggested  that
potentially  serious  errors  could  be  made  so  far  as  the  levels  of
inequality  and  poverty  are  concerned.  Emipirically,  we showed  that
this  is  indeed  the  case  - the  errors  are  of  the  order  of  30% or  more.
In  the  case  of  poverty  measurement  we showed  theoretically  and
empirically  that  for  certain  measures  of  poverty  the  errors  could  be
of  either  sign  - a  careful  analysis  is  therefore  required  before  any
claims  are  made  as  to  whether  poverty  is  understated  or  overstated.
So  far  as  the  patterns  of  inequality  and  poverty  are
concerned,  our  theoretical  analysis  was more  equivocal  - significant
differences  in  the  cross  group  patterns  of  intra-household  inequality
are  required  to  reverse  the  true  rankings  of  policy-relevant  socio-
economic  groups  by  inequality  and  poverty,  when  intra-household
inequality  is  ignored.  Our  cmpirical  analysis  lends  support  to  this
equivocation  - the  changes  in  patterns  of  inequality  when  intra-
household  inequality  is  ignored  are  by  no  means  dramatic;  sometimes,
they  hardly  change  at  all.
There  is  clearly  a  need  to  further  confirm  our  results  for
other  data  sets  in  other  countries.  We hope  to  have  provided  both  a
framework  in  which  such  analysis  can  proceed  and  a  preliminary
indication  that  the  results  are  inportant  to  policy  makers  who are37
considering  whether  or  not  to  launch  a  costly  intra-household  oriented
survey.  The  conclusions  based  on  our  data  set  are  that  the  collection
of  such  data  is  inportant  if  the  object  is  to  get  an  estimate  of  the
levels  of  inequality  and  poverty;  but  if  the  object  is  to  discover  the
patterns  of  inequality  and  poverty  across  key  socio-econcxnic  groups,
the  policy  maker  would  do  well  to  assess  carefully  the  costs  and
benefiUs  of  such  an  exercise.38
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